COMMENT

by RAY FLEMING
Should the door be firmly shut, left slightly ajar, or held wide open? These, rather than Gordon Brown's famous five economic tests, are now the three questions that the British government has to answer about membership of the euro. It has been evident for some time that the Treasury tests would not demonstrate the “clear and unambiguous” advantage in joining the euro that the Prime Minister and his Chancellor identified as necessary when they set the tests in 1997. The Chancellor will formally announce the government's decision about the euro in the House of Commons on June 9. Between now and then there will be intensive consultations between the Prime Minister and the Chancellor and members of the Cabinet and other ministers directly affected by the decision, culminating in a full Cabinet meeting on June 5 or 6 at which membership of the euro and wider European strategy will be discussed. Before then Cabinet ministers will have been provided with formidably detailed Treasury documentation on the five tests and also papers outlining the political dimensions, in Britan and in Europe, of the decision that has to be taken. It is unlikely that the discussions in Cabinet will dwell on the Treasury's conclusions; having been five years in the making it would be difficult to second-guess them now. Instead the pro - and anti-euro ministers will want to focus on how the Chancellor's announcement on June 9 should be presented. Should it close down the possibility of euro membership for the foreseeable future, an approach which would at least have the virtue of clarity? Or should it hold out the possibility of further Treasury testing in the near future that might lead to a positive outcome; and if this option were chosen, should the time-scale allow for re-consideration before the next general election or only after it? The Prime Minister faces what is probably the most difficult decision of his political life, one that must not be fudged. He is personally committed to Britain's full participation in the European Union. But he cannot go against the advice of his Chancellor on an issue of such fundamental importance. If, however, he leaves an impression of uncertainty he will alienate supporters of the euro in Britain, discourage potential foreign investment in Britain, and risk losing influence in the EU's councils. And overriding all such complex considerations is the brutal political bottom line - even if the government felt able to recommend membership of the euro, in the short or longer term, would it be possible to win the support of the electorate in a referendum? On this, the tide seems to be running against Mr Blair, for two main reasons: the first is that the innate hostility felt towards Europe by many British people has been increased by the recent falling-out with France and Germany over the Iraq resolution in the Security Council; the second is that the imminent proposals from the European Convention for some kind of written constitution for the European Union will further increase suspicions of the EU's federalist and centralist instincts. Mr Blair will not want to give up. But it is difficult to avoid the feeling that once again, as it has done time after time since the 1950s, Britain will miss another crucially important opportunity of proving its genuine commitment to the European idea and ideal and of serving its own best interests.